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CLARIFYING THE “PROBATE LENDING” DEBATE: A 
RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS HORTON AND 
CHANDRASEKHER 
Jeremy Kidd, Ph.D. 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate over third-party funding of legal claims just got more interesting.  
The debate already had plot twists, such as free-market scholars
1
 lining up in 
opposition to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
2
 and alongside proplaintiff scholars
3
 
who they oppose in tort reform debates.  Now add to the mix a recent paper by 
Professors Horton and Chandrasekher
4
 that introduced an entirely new angle to the 
debate: funding of probate disputes.  Now that this parallel area of funding has been 
identified, comparing and contrasting probate funding with litigation funding should 
illuminate the incentives that funders/recipients face in both scenarios.  By pointing 
out the importance of probate funding, Professors Horton and Chandrasekher have 
benefitted the debate. 
 
© 2018 Jeremy Kidd.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies 
of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy 
identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this 
provision and copyright notice. 
  Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law.  Thanks to Christian 
Johnson for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1 See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to 
the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613 (2012); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market 
in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury 
Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987). 
 2 See generally JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY 
INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION (2012). 
 3 See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 120–33 (2011); 
Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
1268 (2011). 
 4 David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE L.J. 102 
(2016). 
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And yet, their contribution does not make the impact that it should have made, 
due to some unfortunate and avoidable missteps.  This Essay identifies the authors’ 
mistakes so that the debate can proceed in more fruitful fashion.  Part I addresses 
how Probate Lending gives short shrift to the difficult questions involved in 
discerning whether probate funding is a loan.  Part II points out how the authors 
mistakenly conclude that they have measured ex ante risk instead of ex post results.  
Part III argues that the authors presume too much when they derive broad policy 
conclusions from an extremely narrow empirical study and when they ignore 
alternative explanations that are at least as plausible as those they champion.  This 
Essay then concludes. 
I.     WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
One of the most pivotal arguments in the debate over legal funding is whether 
or not it constitutes a loan, since the answer to that question determines whether or 
not the transactions are subject to usury and other consumer protection laws.
5
  The 
authors’ choice of title—Probate Lending—begins with the presumption of a 
lending relationship that would make these transactions loans.  It is true that the 
authors make an attempt to prove that probate funding transactions are loans, but 
their choice of title indicates that they were offering justifications for a conclusion 
they never questioned. 
Why does it matter?  Because the exchange of money in return for a future 
return payment might be a loan, but it might also be an investment, a loan-investment 
hybrid, or perhaps just a purchase of a property interest.  Usury laws do not apply to 
investment transactions and they certainly would not apply to a purchase of property; 
neither would the requirements of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA).
6
  The 
authors could have chosen a more neutral term to describe these transactions, such 
as “probate funding” or “probate financing,” but not only did they use a term that 
presumes the status as a loan, the absence of any mention indicates that they were 
likely blind to their biases. 
In its limited attempt to address the loan versus investment distinction, Probate 
Lending asks only whether probate funding agreements are contingent.  The 
contingent nature of the transaction is one that courts have considered carefully 
when determining whether something is a loan,
7
 but it need not and should not 
 
 5 See, e.g., Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 409 (Colo. 2015) (holding 
that litigation funding was a loan under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code); Anglo-Dutch Petrol. 
Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 96–97 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that litigation funding was 
not a loan subject to state usury laws). 
 6 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1601 (2012)). 
 7 See, e.g., Capela v. J.G. Wentworth, LLC, No. CV09-882, 2009 WL 3128003, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (holding that a structured settlement was not a loan because there was 
no absolute obligation to pay the settlement installments); Haskell, 193 S.W.3d at 96–97 (refusing 
to apply usury laws to a litigation funding agreement because the funder’s ability to recover was 
contingent on the outcome of the lawsuit); Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litigation Finance and 
the Usury Challenge: A Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 334–35 (2012) (stating 
the majority rule that litigation funding is not subject to usury laws because they are only 
contingently repayable).  But see Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC, 361 P.3d at 409 (holding that an 
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conclude the analysis.  Yet, it is precisely where the authors abandon their inquiry 
after concluding that probate funding is less contingent than litigation funding.
8
 
Is probate funding contingent, then?  The recipient of probate funding receives 
money in exchange for the right to pursue some portion of the heir’s claim to the 
estate.
9
  If the heir’s claim is successful, the funder receives some percentage of the 
heir’s portion, as agreed to in the funding document.10  Importantly, the funding 
transaction is nonrecourse, so the funder can only receive as much as the heir would 
have received from the estate.
11
  Probate Lending concludes that, because the vast 
majority of funding transactions yield a positive return for the funder, the contingent 
nature of the funding transaction is merely “colorable,” at best.12  This conclusion, 
however, is suspect, even given the authors’ own data. 
In one case, the heir received no award, leaving the funder without any 
recovery.
13
  In two other cases, the funder recovered less than the amount advanced, 
yielding a negative return.
14
  The authors dismiss these cases as representing easily 
preventable mistakes and argue that they are “not likely to recur.”15  This strains 
credulity, for it requires the reader to believe that, somehow, the authors have 
managed to capture a unique occurrence purely by accident.  Probate funding has 
been ongoing since at least 2004,
16
 and it is highly unlikely that the only time these 
negative-return outcomes were realized was during the short window of time studied 
by the authors.  Far more likely is that these events are regular, even if they only 
comprise a small percentage of the total funding arrangements. 
There are many reasons to believe the probate funding process is subject to 
significant uncertainties.  The authors concede that an heir might receive little to 
nothing because the probate process drains the estate.
17
  Other contingencies that 
could lead to an heir’s not receiving the expected inheritance include unforeseen 
bills that the estate must pay or even the discovery of an unknown will that 
disinherits an heir that received funding.  All of these possibilities reflect the reality 
that our legal system—even our probate system—is not merely a mechanistic 
process.  There is every reason to suspect that the probate funding transaction reflects 
an attempt by the heir to transfer the burden of uncertainty—either temporal18 or 
 
absolute repayment obligation was not necessary for the Uniform Consumer Credit Code definition 
of loan to apply). 
 8 Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 140–46. 
 9 See id. at 118. 
 10 See id. at 125. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. at 142–43 (arguing that the funding transaction is “absolutely repayable”). 
 13 Id. at 143 (“[O]ne company lost its entire investment when the personal representative 
stole the decedent’s assets and then disappeared.”). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 143–44. 
 16 Id. at 125. 
 17 Id. at 163 (“[P]robate litigation is notorious for allowing attorneys and personal 
representatives to bleed the estate dry . . . .”). 
 18 In Probate Lending, the probate process is referred to as “snail-like,” which could explain 
heirs’ preferences for bypassing the temporal risk and receiving money now.  Id. at 135. 
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substantive
19—to the funder.  The authors even concede that time preference—pure 
temporal risk—cannot fully explain the heir’s decision to seek out a funding 
opportunity,
20
 but fail to grasp the full import of that concession. 
The risk assumed by probate funders is not illusory, as claimed in Probate 
Lending.  Real and significant contingencies—not only whether the heir will be 
entitled to any portion of the estate but also when payment will occur—lead heirs to 
seek out probate funders, and those contingencies cannot be assumed away.
21
  That 
the authors do so is yet another indication that they are unaware of their bias in favor 
of probate funding as loans. 
Even if probate funding were largely devoid of contingencies, however, there 
is an even more compelling reason to doubt that these transactions are properly 
considered loans.  Put simply, they bear far more resemblance to a purchase of a 
property interest.  In many cases, what an heir stands to inherit is actual property, 
real or personal.
22
  Even in cases where the heir inherits money, it is often derived 
from the sale of property,
23
 indicating that the heir had a de facto interest in that 
property and has the right to alienate that interest. 
Probate Lending even concedes this point, describing a number of funding 
transactions where the funder was granted an interest in real property,
24
 and states: 
“Courts generally do not apply the doctrine [of champerty] to parties who first 
acquire an interest in property and then bring a cause of action related to that 
property.  This is an apt description of probate lenders . . . .”25  Strangely, this fact is 
acknowledged for the purpose of arguing that the doctrine of champerty should not 
be applied, but its import is far broader, because sale of property is of an entirely 
different type than a loan transaction. 
Of course, if the authors are wrong that probate funding is a loan transaction, 
their arguments in favor of applying usury laws and TILA rules are without factual 
support and must be abandoned. 
 
 19 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Lyon, Why Economists Discount Future Benefits, 92 ECOLOGICAL 
MODELLING 253 (1996) (explaining that interest rates reflect both a time preference and a 
substantive risk component).  The two may overlap, with every delay increasing not only the time 
to receipt of the inheritance, but also the risk that further complications will deplete the estate or 
disinherit the heir.  The passage of time can reduce the heir’s total award even if the heir’s share of 
the estate ends up exactly as expected. 
 20 Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 134–35 (concluding that neither general delays 
nor financial pressures on the heir explain the use of probate funding). 
 21 They are, in fact, pivotal to the question.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 527 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“A creditor who takes the chance of losing all or part of the 
sum to which he would be entitled if he bargained for the return of his money with the highest 
permissible rate of interest is allowed to contract for greater profit.”). 
 22 Probate Lending makes this point explicitly in its statistical analysis.  See Horton & 
Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 157 (describing how one independent variable used was whether 
the probate process “divided property unequally among similarly situated relatives” (emphasis 
added)). 
 23 Cf. id. at 157–58. 
 24 See id. at 144 n.244. 
 25 Id. at 160–61. 
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II.     HOW TO MEASURE RISK? 
The authors also make a fundamental error in their assessment of risk.  Risk is 
an inherently ex ante concern.
26
  It is never measured by ex post results.  It is the 
potential for future adverse events that leads us to take precautions to mitigate the 
likelihood of those future events or to pay insurance premiums to compensate us if 
those events occur and cause harm.  The lower the risk, the fewer the precautions 
and the lower the premium, but it would be incorrect to assert that there was no risk 
during a year in which no adverse events occurred.  It would be incorrect to claim 
that someone had been robbed because health insurance premiums have been paid 
but nothing bad had happened which required payment by the insurance company.  
Yet, this is precisely what Probate Lending does, repeatedly concluding that probate 
funding has little to no risk
27
 because the vast majority of transactions yielded 
positive ex post results.
28
 
Countering the authors’ claim that there is no risk are the very examples from 
their dataset where funders realized a loss.
29
  In another example of confusing ex 
post results with ex ante risk, Probate Lending concludes that these losses are 
aberrations that are easily accounted for and will therefore not likely be repeated.
30
  
Importantly, however, there is no evidence that the authors scrutinized the 
successfully recouped funding agreements for the risk factors that led to the losses.  
It is therefore possible that these risk factors were more common than what appears 
in a solely ex post analysis. 
In the first two cases that experienced losses, the funders “unwisely entered 
into assignments before the [Inventory and Appraisal] was filed.”31  The authors are 
certainly correct that by so doing there was a risk that the value of the estate would 
not be high enough to allow payment in full.  Similarly, in the third case, the losses 
were the result of the personal representative absconding with the decedent’s 
assets.
32
  There, the funding arrangement was signed prior to requiring the personal 
representative to post a bond to assure payment to all stakeholders.
33
  Once again, 
the authors are correct that a slight change in the process would have minimized that 
risk. 
 
 26 See Thomas Root, Defining, Measuring, Managing, and Facing Risk, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 
571, 572 (2008) (“[R]isk is something that we do not know with certainty.  It is an outcome about 
which we cannot be certain.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 144. 
 28 See id. at 143 (arguing that there was no risk because ninety-six percent of the authors’ 
dataset of transactions “were fully reimbursed”). 
 29 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  As a separate matter, these cases appear 
to have been dropped from the authors’ calculation of “interest rates,” as they appear nowhere in 
Table 3.  See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 145 tbl.3.  Had these cases been included, 
the authors would have needed to include at least one category for negative interest rates.  When 
the claim is that probate funding has high average interest rates, dropping low outliers looks highly 
suspicious. 
 30 See id. at 144. 
 31 Id. at 143. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 143–44. 
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Their analysis fails, however, because at no time do they indicate that they 
scrutinized the profitable funding transactions for these potential problems.  In other 
words, they appear to have presumed zero risk factors where profit was realized, but 
it is entirely possible that some profitable funding transactions also exhibited these 
characteristics.  In fact, competition in a market such as this will tend to drive funders 
to make earlier offers—further minimizing the customer’s temporal risk—even prior 
to the filing of the Inventory and Appraisal.
34
  This is a well-developed market,
35
 
making it far more likely that what the authors consider foolish mistakes were, 
instead, increased risk assumption by funders in a competitive market.  This is one 
of many ways in which the authors’ misunderstanding of risk corrupts their results. 
III.     PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS 
The authors deserve credit for undertaking to use data to better understand 
probate funding.  Unfortunately, empirical work done poorly more often misleads 
than enlightens.
36
  Probate Lending suffers from a number of important 
methodological flaws, which make its conclusions highly suspect as general 
propositions. 
A.   Limited Data 
The most damaging flaw is that Probate Lending offers broad policy 
prescriptions based on data collected from a single county—out of 3031 counties in 
the United States
37—for a period of only fourteen months.38  Small datasets are not 
useless—they can provide the groundwork for basic hypotheses and motivate future 
research—but any conclusions drawn from limited data should be accompanied by 
a host of qualifiers.  The authors offer no such qualifications and go in the opposite 
direction, touting their source as a “trove of empirical evidence.”39 
The limited nature of the dataset hinders its usefulness in two important ways.  
First, the population of Alameda County is not a representative sample of the U.S. 
 
 34 In a market with multiple funders, all funders compete for the same contracts.  To succeed, 
participants must offer some combination of price and quality improvements.  In the probate 
funding scenario, these will include a lower differential between amount funded and amount repaid, 
better ancillary terms, and earlier funding.  Competition need not always result in earlier payments, 
but competitive pressures and consumers’ positive time preference, see Lyon, supra note 19, at 
259, make time horizon for payment an important margin upon which market players will compete. 
 35 Forms of this type of funding have existed for hundreds of years, with the current form 
beginning either in 2004 or at least in 2005 with the passage of Cal. Prob. Code § 11604.5.  See 
Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 118–26 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604.5 (West 
2016)).  
 36 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, A Comment on Daniel Klein’s “A Plea to Economists Who 
Favor Liberty,” 27 E. ECON. J. 203, 205 (2001) (“As Ronald Coase says, ‘if you torture the data 
long enough it will confess.’”). 
 37 Local Governments by Type and State: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=COG_2012_O
RG02.US01&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  This excludes independent cities and 
other county equivalents. 
 38 Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 130–31. 
 39 Id. at 108. 
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population.  Table 1 compares county, state, and federal statistics, and in none of the 
categories represented is Alameda County a reflection of California or the United 
States, as a whole.
40
  The authors do not address this fundamental shortcoming or 
offer any substantive justifications.  As a result, the conclusions drawn from data 
exclusive to Alameda County are, at best, interesting and useful for future inquiry; 






County California United States 
Median Age 36.6 35.2 37.2 
Gender (% Female) 51 50.3 50.8 
Race     
     White 47.7 61.6 74.8 
     Black 14.2 7.2 13.6 
     Hispanic 22.5 37.6 16.3 
     Asian 29.2 14.9 5.6 
     Pacific Islander 1.5 0.8 0.4 
     Other 12.4 18.9 7.0 
Labor Force Participation 66.2 63.8 63.9 
Median Household                                                   
Income $73,775.00 $61,489.00 $53,482.00 
Uninsured 11.8 16.7 14.2 
Poverty Rate 12.9 16.4 15.6 
% Rent 46.6 44.1 34.9 
Single Parent 18.1 19.3 18.1 
     
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
www.census.gov/quickfacts (last visited Mar. 7, 
2017).     
 
Second, the fact that the results are derived from a span of only fourteen months 
means that nothing can be said regarding rates of change.  After Probate Lending, 
we know nothing new about trends in utilization of probate funding, competition in 
the market, or any other intertemporal concerns.  These are not frivolous concerns.  
 
 40 Probate Lending acknowledges that California may not be representative of the country 
when it says that probate funding is “more established in California than elsewhere.”  Id. at 128.  
That alone would be enough to limit any conclusions to the state of California, but the obvious next 
step would normally be to acknowledge that Alameda County may not be representative of 
California, making it harder to draw any broad conclusions.  Admittedly, these particular statistics 
were chosen in ad hoc fashion, representing some of the more common demographic characteristics 
that might be of use.  However, even such an ad hoc analysis is missing from Probate Lending. 
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If probate funding is being utilized with decreasing frequency, for example, any 
problems are resolving themselves and statutory or regulatory reforms are unlikely 
to have much effect.  Similarly, if competition in the probate funding market is 
increasing over time, then prices—the differential between the amount funded and 
the amount received—will be decreasing and consumer service will be improving, 
mitigating or eliminating consumer-protection concerns. 
B.   Ignoring Alternative Explanations 
One of the primary questions in the broader legal funding debate is whether it 
leads to more litigation,
41
 particularly frivolous litigation.
42
  The empirical data is 
inconclusive,
43
 but there is reason to suspect that increased litigation need not be a 
foregone conclusion.
44
  Probate Lending claims empirical support for the claim that 
probate funding increases the total amount of litigation.
45
  Those results, however, 
require defining litigation very broadly,
46
 to include not only new probate cases but 
every motion filed in every case, so long as that motion “spark[ed] an objection from 
an adverse party.”47 
The decision to consider every motion filed is potentially useful, but to 
conclude that “[p]robate lending thus introduces litigious third parties into the court 
system”48 requires far more justification than the authors are willing to provide.  
Perhaps probate funding increases the costs or the duration of probate disputes?  No, 
Probate Lending concludes that there is no increase in the number of days until the 
probate matter was resolved,
49
 and there is no data provided regarding costs. 
The authors’ conclusions that more motions are filed in disputes with funding50 
deserves closer inspection.  Unlike a traditional heir, a probate funder has paid 
something for the right to be involved in the process, so the funder should be more 
conscious of the margins, filing motions only when the returns clearly outweigh the 
 
 41 See, e.g., BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 2, at 4 (“[Third-Party Litigation Financing] can 
be expected to prompt an increase in the filing of questionable claims.”); see also Michael 
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 743–45 (2005); Kidd, supra 
note 1, at 624–27; Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 342–46. 
 42 Kidd, supra note 1, at 627–29. 
 43 David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third 
Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1097–1103 (2013) (finding evidence of an 
increase in litigation but at only weak levels of significance). 
 44 See Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1239, 1246–54 (2016) (concluding that litigation funding is unlikely to yield a significant 
increase in the total amount of litigation). 
 45 See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 4, at 158. 
 46 Probate Lending concedes that its definition of litigation is, perhaps, not ideal.  Id. at 160 
(“[B]ecause we defined ‘litigation’ so broadly—as any contested petition—we have swept up 
claims that may be only tenuously related to the presence of a lender.”). 
 47 Id. at 157.  Probate funding does not increase deaths and cannot, therefore, increase the 
number of estates that need disposition.  At worst, the substitution of funder for traditional heir 
could force the estate into probate prior to the wishes of the rest of the heirs, but that is a matter of 
timing only. 
 48 Id. at 160. 
 49 Id. at 163. 
 50 Id. at 158. 
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legal costs.  Conversely, a traditional heir might file out of spite or in response to 
some relational dynamic amongst the heirs.  What could motivate funders to file 
more motions than traditional heirs?  The authors claim funders have a more litigious 
nature, but two alternative answers are both plausible and more in line with the 
incentives faced by funders: first, that funding is more likely in connection with 
estates that are more likely to be litigious for other reasons; and second, that the 
nature of filings by funders are of a different type. 
Heirs caught up in a more contentious probate dispute will have greater 
incentive to sell their interests—partially or entirely—to a funder.  Greater conflict 
means that the process will likely be lengthier and costlier—monetarily and 
otherwise—and the ultimate outcome is likely to be based, in part, on which heir is 
the most stubborn.  All of these factors increase the risk to each individual heir; since 
funders are better able to bear or avoid those risks, an opportunity for exchange 
arises and the heir will be willing to pay the funder a premium to accept some or all 
of those risks.  Probate Lending acknowledges this possibility,
51
 but dismisses the 
reverse-causation explanation because “[i]n two-thirds of these cases, the petition or 
objection was initiated by the lender itself.”52  To be clear, a plausible explanation 
for a full third of all cases investigated is ignored because it did not account for all 
cases. 
Plausible explanations for the remaining two-thirds are also ignored.  The 
motions might have been standard practice and would have eventually been filed by 
traditional heirs; the funder might simply have filed first.  It is also possible that the 
other heirs favored the petition or objection but, due to the complex relationships 
that exist in families or otherwise among heirs, could not file.  In both cases, the 
funder has not instigated any legal proceedings that were not preferred by other 
heirs; if anything, the funder may have sped up the process and made everyone better 
off.  This is consistent with another finding of Probate Lending: while more petitions 
or objections are filed in proceedings that involve a funding agreement, those 
proceedings do not last any longer, on average, than those without funding.
53
 
One type of filing might be different—a petition to be appointed personal 
representative.  The authors ascribe funders’ filing of these petitions to “rank self-
interest,”54 a pejorative as unfortunate as it is dismissive of Adam Smith’s centuries-
old insight that self-interest need not be detrimental to the interests of others.
55
  The 
 
 51 Id. at 160 (conceding that it is possible that “litigation causes loans”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. at 163. 
 54 Id. at 162.  Probate Lending also includes petitions for a preliminary distribution or to 
require the personal representative to sell real property.  Id.  These petitions may certainly be 
motivated by self-interest, but they would be regardless of who filed them, and there is no evidence 
provided that probate funders file them at a greater rate or—more importantly—that such petitions 
by probate funders are granted more frequently than when filed by a more traditional heir.  Petitions 
to be appointed personal representative are of a different type. 
 55 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 11 (London, Hartford 1811) (“[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his 
brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.  He will be more likely 
to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own 
advantage to do for him what he requires of them. . . .  It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”). 
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question is not whether funders will seek out their own interests—as all individuals 
do—but whether those interests are properly aligned with the rest of the heirs. 
A funder who is paid as a personal representative is, at worst, depriving another 
heir of a paycheck, but this is a transfer rather than a drain on the estate.  In fact, a 
funder has reason to develop expertise in disposing of an estate quickly and 
efficiently,
56
 so the selection of the funder as a personal representative can be 
beneficial to the remaining heirs.
57
  While there may be some heirs who wish the 
process to drag on for a variety of personal reasons, the only interests that can be 
said to be common to all heirs is a speedy, inexpensive resolution of the estate.  The 
most reasonable assumption, therefore, is that a funder’s interests are properly 
aligned with the heirs, and one’s appointment as personal representative should have 
no negative effect on the estate. 
These are plausible explanations for Probate Lending’s results; rather than 
proving that probate funders are overly litigious, the results could just as easily be 
evidence of probate funders making the process more efficient.  The authors hint at 
conceding these alternatives, but exert almost no effort in justifying their 
conclusions to the contrary.  Instead, they brush past them and either ignore or 
casually dismiss them.  As a result, the conclusions in Probate Lending are little 
more than the authors’ personal preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Probate Lending starts a dialog that is worth having as part of the ongoing 
debate over how and where third-party funders will be allowed to have a role in our 
judicial system.  It opens up a new line of inquiry, and the comparisons between the 
litigation process and the probate process will hopefully aid in understanding the 
impact of funding on both areas of law.  Unfortunately, there are too many 
significant flaws for it to be more than a cursory first step.  It falls short of proving 
that probate funding is a loan transaction, subject to usury and TILA rules.  It 
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of risk, mistaking ex post results for ex 
ante probabilities.  Finally, its largest potential contribution—statistical analysis of 
probate disputes—suffers from nearly fatal flaws. 
Even with these significant flaws, Probate Lending has the potential to move 
the legal funding debate forward in important ways.  Until its flaws are remedied, 




 56 The funder, more than anything else, wants their investment in the estate to be profitable, 
and that requires speed and minimal costs. 
 57 It bears asking why a probate court would choose a funder with no connection to the 
decedent as the personal representative.  Unless it can be credited that the court is simply derelict 
in its responsibilities, it must make the choice believing that, in fact, the funder has the best chance 
of disposing of the estate in the most efficient manner possible, thereby minimizing the costs and 
assuring every heir of receiving a greater inheritance. 
